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ABSTRACT
Recent discoveries in behavioral economics have led scholars to question the underpinnings of
neoclassical economics. We use insights gained from one of the most influential lines of behavioral
research – gift exchange – in an attempt to maximize worker effort in two quite distinct tasks: data
entry for a university library and door-to-door fundraising for a research center. In support of the
received literature, our field evidence suggests that worker effort in the first few hours on the job is
considerably higher in the “gift” treatment than in the “non-gift treatment. After the initial few hours,
however, no difference in outcomes is observed, and overall the gift treatment yielded inferior
aggregate outcomes for the employer: with the same budget we would have logged more data for our
library and raised more money for our research center by using the market-clearing wage rather than
by trying to induce greater effort with a gift of higher wages.
Uri Gneezy
















Neoclassical economics treats labor as a hired input in much the same manner as 
capital.  Accordingly, in equilibrium, the firm pays market-clearing wages and workers 
provide minimum effort.  The validity of this assumption is not always supported by real- 
life observations—some employers pay more than the market-clearing wage, and workers 
seemingly invest more effort than necessary (Akerlof, 1982).  The “fair wage-effort” 
hypothesis of Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen, (1988; 1990) extends the 
neoclassical model to explain higher than market clearing wages by using a gift exchange 
model, where “On the worker’s side, the ‘gift’ given is work in excess of the minimum 
work standard; and on the firm’s side the ‘gift’ given is wages in excess of what these 
women could receive if they left their current jobs” (Akerlof, 1982, p.544).
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The gift exchange model is based on the critical assumption of a positive 
relationship between wages and worker effort levels.  Workers are assumed to respond to 
high wage levels by increasing their effort (positive reciprocity) and to low wage levels 
by decreasing their effort (negative reciprocity) to the minimum required, in retaliation 
for the low wage.  A large and influential body of empirical evidence in support of 
reciprocity has been reported in the past two decades.
2  One of the first experiments to 
test this assumption is Fehr et al. (1993), who constructed a market with excess supply of 
labor, ensuring a low equilibrium wage.  Under their setup, employees had no pecuniary 
                                                 
1 The notion of gift exchange was apparently first proposed by Adams (1963), who posited that in social 
exchange between two agents the ratio of the perceived value of the inputs (e.g., wage) to the perceived 
value of outputs (e.g., resulting from the employee’s effort) would be equivalent. 
2 See, for example, Kahneman et al. (1986), Fehr et al. (1993, 1997), Berg et al. (1995), Guth et al. (1982), 
Guth (1995), Roth (1995), Mowday (1991), Charness (2005), Falk and Gächter (2002), and Fehr and Falk 
(1999).  For a survey and discussion of positive and negative reciprocity, see Fehr and Gächter (2000).  For 
a survey of the theoretical models of reciprocity see Sobel (2005).  This picture is confirmed by scholarly 
work in many other fields.  It is accounted for in interview studies that economists have conducted with 
business leaders (Agell and Lundborg, 1995) and it is consistent with discussions in organization theory 
(Steers and Lyman, 1991) and psychology (Argyle, 1989).  
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incentive to raise the quality of their work above the exogenously given minimum.  If an 
employer expects employees to invest only the minimum effort required, then she has no 
compelling reason to pay wages above the market-clearing level.  Contrary to this 
prediction, however, most employers attempted to induce employees to invest greater 
effort by offering them higher (at times by more than 100%) than market-clearing wages.  
On average, this high wage was reciprocated by greater employee effort, making it 
profitable for employers to offer high wage contracts.  Subsequent laboratory exercises 
have largely led to similar conclusions.   
While the literature has taken the experimental results as providing key support 
for the received labor market predictions of Akerlof (1982)—see, e.g., Fehr et al. (1993, 
p. 437), who note that their results “provide…experimental support for the fair wage-
effort theory of involuntary unemployment”—it remains largely unknown whether such 
inference is appropriate from observed laboratory behavior.  In this case, for example, is 
the behavior of laboratory subjects, who are asked to choose an effort or wage level (by 
circling or jotting down a number) in response to pecuniary incentive structures, a good 
indicator of actual behavior in labor markets?   
We tackle this issue directly by focusing on real effort in labor markets using field 
experiments.  In this regard, one key missing link in the literature between the laboratory 
and labor markets is the duration of the task.  While interaction in the lab is typically 
abbreviated, and usually takes no longer than one or two hours, interaction in labor 
markets typically lasts weeks, months, or years.  One lesson learned from the psychology 
literature is that there are important behavioral differences between psychological 
processes in the short run and in the long run:  for example, hot versus cold decision  
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making.  In many cases, the immediate reaction to an event is dictated by what is called 
“hot” decision making (Loewenstein, 2005).  People’s decision making behavior in this 
“hot” phase is different than in the “cold” phase (the folk wisdom of counting to 10 
before one reacts is based on such a difference).  Additionally, adaptation has been found 
to be important.  Much like the human eye adapts to changes in light, decision makers 
tend to adapt to new situations over time (Gilbert et al., 1998).   
To provide a first test of the gift exchange hypothesis in an actual labor market, 
we invited people to take part in an effort to computerize the holdings of a small library 
at a large university in the Midwest.  Recruitment was done via posters that promised 
participants one-time work that would last six hours and that would pay $12 per hour, or 
$72.  Participants were not informed that they were taking part in an experiment.   
The first treatment paid a flat wage of $12 per hour, as promised.  In the second 
treatment, once the task was explained to the participants, they were told that they would 
be paid $20 per hour, not the $12 that had been promised.  We found that, in line with the 
gift exchange hypothesis, participants in the $20 treatment provided significantly higher 
effort in the first 90 minutes than participants in the $12 treatment.  After 90 minutes on 
the job, however, effort levels were indistinguishable across the two treatments.   
Our second field experiment invited students to take part in a door-to-door 
fundraising drive to support the Natural Hazards Mitigation Research Center at a large 
university in the Southeast.  Similar to the library task, participants were told that this 
was  one-time work for which they would be paid $10 per hour.  Yet an important 
difference in this case is that workers have a better idea about the surplus and how much 
the employer valued the task.  This difference is important because if the surplus is  
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known, the share of the surplus that the workers receive will determine whether they 
perceive their wage as fair.
3   
The first treatment was a flat wage of $10 per hour, as promised.  In the second 
treatment, once the solicitors were trained, they were told that they would be paid $20 per 
hour, not the $10 that had been advertised.  Empirical results mirror those in the library 
task:  solicitors in the $20 treatment raised significantly more money in the first few 
hours of the task than solicitors in the $10 treatment.  Yet after a few hours the observed 
outcomes were indistinguishable.   
The remainder of our study proceeds as follows.  Section II presents the 
experimental design.  Section III discusses the experimental results.  Section IV 
summarizes how our work relates to the literature.  Section V concludes. 
II.  Experimental Designs 
A.  Library Task 
Our first field experiment was conducted at a large university, using 
undergraduate student participants who were invited to take part in an effort to 
computerize the holdings of a small library at the university.  Recruitment posters 
informed potential participants that this was one-time work that would last exactly six 
hours, for which they would be paid $12 per hour.  Each participant performed the task 
alone, without viewing the other participants. 
Treatment noGift offered laborers a flat wage of $12 per hour, as promised.  In the 
second treatment, denoted Treatment Gift, once the task was explained to the participants 
they were told that they would be paid $20 per hour rather than the $12 rate advertised.  
                                                 
3 Alternatively, if workers know only the promised wage and not the surplus, as in our library task, only the 
promised wage can serve as a reference point. We thank Ernst Fehr for pointing us in this direction.    
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The task 
  Participants were seated in front of a computer terminal next to boxes filled with 
books, and asked to enter data regarding the books into a database on the computer.  The 
data included title, author, publisher, ISBN number, and year of publication.  Participants 
could take a break from their work whenever was necessary.  The experimental monitor 
recorded the number of books they entered every 90 minutes. 
  Before proceeding to a discussion of the second field experiment, we should 
briefly mention a few design issues.  First, students were not informed that they were 
taking part in an experiment.  This is important given that we wished to observe subjects 
in a natural work environment.  Second, we were careful to remind them that this was a 
one-time work opportunity.  This is important in light of an alternative theory to the fair 
wage effort hypothesis—efficiency wage theory—which surmises that employers pay 
above market-clearing wages to motivate workers to increase their effort level in order to 
avoid being fired, which economizes on firm-level monitoring (see, e.g., Katz, 1986).  
Third, we calculated that we would need roughly 100-120 hours of total worker time to 
complete the task.  Thus, to test our duration hypothesis we hired 19 workers for 6 hours 
each, splitting the sample into n=10 and n=9 for the noGift and Gift treatments 
respectively.  Finally, we distributed books across individuals randomly in order to 
ensure orthogonality of book type and treatment.  
B.  Fundraising Task 
  Our second field experiment was part of a door-to-door fundraising drive to 
support the Natural Hazards Mitigation Research Center (henceforth the Hazards Center)  
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at a large university.
4  Door-to-door fundraising is widely used by a diverse range of 
organizations.  In both treatments, which follow the two library task treatments, 
households in predetermined neighborhood blocks in Pitt County, North Carolina, were 
approached by a paid solicitor and asked if they would like to make a contribution to 
support the Hazards Center.  Households that answered the door were provided an 
informational brochure about the Hazards Center and read a fixed script that outlined the 
reason for the solicitor’s visit.  The script included a brief introduction which informed 
the resident of who the solicitors were, the purpose of their visit, and a one- to two- 
sentence summary of the non-profit organization.  Copies of the script are provided in the 
Appendix. 
  As summarized in the Appendix, potential donors were informed that all proceeds 
raised in the fundraising campaign would be used to fund the Hazards Center.   
Households were also informed that each dollar contributed to the Hazards Center would 
provide them with one ticket for a $1000 lottery, with the chances of winning the prize 
based upon the total number of tickets allocated.
5   
  The experimental treatments were conducted on two different weekends in 
November 2004.  In total, we employed 23 solicitors – 10 in the noGift treatment and 13 
in the Gift treatment.  Potential subjects were recruited via flyers posted around campus, 
                                                 
4 The Natural Hazard Mitigation Research Center was authorized to begin operations in the fall of 2004 by 
the North Carolina state government.  The Hazard Center was founded in response to the widespread 
devastation in eastern North Carolina caused by hurricanes Dennis and Floyd and designed to provide 
support and coordination for research on natural hazard risks.  For more information on the Hazard 
Mitigation Research Center see www.artsci.ecu.edu/cas/auxiliary/hazardcenter/home.htm.  The design 
discussion follows Landry et al. (2006), who explore various mechanisms—voluntary contributions 
mechanisms with and without seed money and two types of lotteries—for inducing charitable 
contributions.   
5 We also randomly placed solicitors in a treatment with a multiple-prize lottery.  The data across these two 
lottery types are not significantly different so we pool them and suppress further discussion.  See Landry et 
al. (2006) for a further discussion of the broader lottery results.    
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announcements on a university electronic bulletin board, advertisements in the local 
campus newspaper, and direct appeal to students during undergraduate economics 
courses.  All solicitors were told they would be paid $10 per hour during training and 
employment.   
Each solicitor’s experience typically followed four steps: (1) consideration of an 
invitation to work as a paid volunteer for the research center, (2) an in-person interview, 
(3) a training session, and (4) participation as a solicitor in the door-to-door campaign.  
Upon being hired (all applicants were hired), all solicitors attended a one-hour training 
session on Friday afternoon of the weekend they were scheduled to work.
6  Upon arriving 
on Saturday morning, subjects were split randomly into two groups, after which one 
group (Treatment Gift) was informed separately that its members would receive $20 per 
hour, rather than the $10 hourly rate the other group (Treatment noGift) received.  All 
solicitors participated during a single weekend and were not informed that they were 
participants in an experimental study; nor were they informed that different solicitors 
were being paid different amounts.  Further, care was taken to keep solicitors in different 
experimental treatments isolated from one another to prevent cross-contamination and 
information exchange across treatments.   
A few important design issues should be discussed before proceeding to the 
results summary.  First, solicitors were provided with a record sheet which included 
columns to record the race, gender, and approximate age of potential donors, along with 
their contribution level.  The trainer stressed the importance of recording the contribution 
                                                 
6 Each training session was conducted by the same researcher and covered a single treatment. The training 
sessions provided the solicitor with background/historical information about the Hazards Center and 
reviewed the organization’s mission statement and purpose.  Solicitors were provided a copy of the 
brochure and the press release announcing the formation of the Hazards Center.  Once solicitors were 
familiarized with the Hazards Center, the trainer reviewed the data collection procedures.    
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(or non-contribution) data immediately following the solicitation “sales-pitch”.  This 
permits us to examine the temporal nature of effort and contributions secured.  Second, 
solicitors were instructed to distribute an information brochure after introducing 
themselves to potential donors.  This provided legitimacy to the fundraising drive, as 
brochures are a common tool in the industry.  Finally, solicitors were instructed to wear 
khaki pants (or shorts) and were provided with a polo shirt that displayed the name of the 
Hazard Center. 
III.  Empirical Results 
A quick summary of the empirical results is that, consistent with the bulk of past 
experimental evidence from the lab, there are signs of significant gift exchange in the 
data:  in the early hours of the task, effort in the Gift treatments is markedly higher than 
in the noGift treatments.  Across both tasks, however, this increased effort wanes quickly, 
and after the first few hours effort levels across the Gift and noGift treatments are 
statistically indistinguishable.  This drop in effort causes us to conclude that for the wage 
levels considered in our treatments, our resources would have been better spent hiring 
agents at market-clearing wages.  Evidence for these empirical findings are described 
more fully below.   
A.  Library Task 
Table 1 provides a raw data summary, and Figure 1 summarizes the temporal 
work effort in the library task split into 90-minute intervals.  In the first 90 minutes, the 
average number of books logged into the computer is quite different across the two 
treatments:  whereas workers logged, on average, 51.7 books in the Gift treatment, an 
average of only 40.7 books were logged in the noGift treatment.  This nearly 25 percent  
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difference is statistically significant at the p < .05 level using a one-tailed Wilcoxon 
(Mann-Whitney) nonparametric test, which has an alternative hypothesis of the Gift 
treatment having more books logged.  To construct the test statistic, we first calculated 
the individual mean books logged in the 90-minute period and then ranked subjects via 
these means.  The test statistic is normally distributed, and takes on a value of z = 1.76.  
A t-test assuming unequal variances also yields statistical significance at the p < .05 level 
using a one-sided alternative:  t = 1.85. 
While this 25 percent difference in effort is indeed noteworthy, inspection of the 
remainder of the temporal effort profile does not provide compelling evidence in favor of 
the gift exchange hypothesis.  None of the remaining effort levels are significantly 
different at conventional levels using Wilcoxon non-parametric tests (z = 0.37; z = 0.96; 
z = -0.40), and the data become quite similar in the final 3 hours; t-tests assuming 
unequal variances yield similar insights.   
To complement these insights we estimate a panel data regression model in which 
we regress the individual number of books logged on a dummy variable for treatment, 
dummy variables for time indicators, and their interaction.  Because the treatment dummy 
variable is static, we report panel data estimates from a random effects regression model 
(the rank condition would be violated if we estimated a fixed effects model).  Estimates 
in Column 1 of Table 2 are consistent qualitatively with the results reported in Table 1 
and Figure 1:  the wage gift increases worker effort levels early on in the experiment but 
this results dissipates over time.   
B.  Fundraising Task  
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  Table 3 provides a summary of the average total contributions collected per hour 
by treatment split into hourly time segments.  Similar to the library task, in the beginning 
of the work day the Gift treatment yields significantly higher outcomes.  For example, as 
shown in Figure 2, examining data in the first (pre-lunch) three hours of the capital 
campaign, we find an average total collection figure in the Gift treatment of $11.00, 
whereas in the noGift treatment solicitors raised only $6.40 per hour, a difference of 70 
percent.  A non-parametric Wilcoxon statistical test indicates that these averages are 
different at the p < .01 level using a one-sided alternative.  This outcome highlights the 
strength of the gift exchange effect.   
Yet as Table 3 reveals, after a few hours on the job the average dollars collected 
(denoted “earnings”) across the two treatments become quite similar.  Indeed, only $0.39 
separates the average dollars collected per hour after lunch across the two treatments.  
And, in any given hourly time period post-lunch, the average total collection earnings 
across the two treatments are not statistically significant at conventional levels.  The data 
summary in Table 4 and Figure 2 provides an indication of why this convergence occurs.  
While the solicitors in the non-gift exchange treatment garner hourly contributions in the 
3-hour block before lunch similar to those in the 3-hour block after lunch ($6.40 versus 
$6.63), solicitors in the gift exchange treatment raise significantly less in the post-lunch 
time period than they raise in the pre-lunch time period—$7.03 per hour versus $11 per 
hour.  Using a matched pairs t-test, we find that this difference is statistically significant 
at the p < .05 level using a two-sided alternative, whereas the temporal difference for the 
non-gift exchange treatment is not significant.   
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For further evidence we again turn to a panel data regression model in which we 
regress the individual monies raised on a dichotomous variable for treatment, dummy 
variables for time indicators, and their interaction.  We again include random effects and 
we should note that we experimented with the individual-specific variables found to be 
important in Landry et al. (2006) and found that their inclusion does not change the 
qualitative insights.  Thus, for parsimony we exclude these variables.  Columns 2 and 3 
of Table 2 contain parameter estimates.  As Column 2 indicates, the hourly data are quite 
noisy, and strong inference cannot be gained from these estimates (a Tobit random effects 
model yields similar insights).  Yet the data split by three hour blocks, pre- and post-
lunch, are consistent with the results discussed above (see Column 3 of Table 2):  the 
wage gift worked well in the first few hours but its influence waned considerably in the 
latter hours.   
One interpretation of these findings is in the spirit of the psychology literature, 
which reminds us that there are differences between psychological processes in the short 
run and in the long run, or “hot” and “cold” phases.  For example, shortly after being 
injured, people with spinal injuries report very low quality of life.  The same people 
report a much higher quality of life after a few years (Gilbert et al., 1998).  One way to 
think of this process is a change in the reference point.  At the beginning of the process, 
people use their “old” reference point (being healthy, previous wage, etc.).  With time, 
the reference point changes to account for the new environment (being injured, new 
wage, etc.), and thus behavior changes accordingly.  In our case, an interpretation of our 
findings is that our agents’ effort levels may simply be adapting to new referentials in 
their progression from a “hot” to “cold” phase of the time spent on their task, although in  
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our case the “hot” phase lasts only a few hours.  This would suggest that the equilibrium 
behavior is one where gift exchange has nominal long-term effects. 
We must exercise caution when making this interpretation, however.  The data 
show a pattern of convergence, but whether this result obtains because solicitors become 
physically exhausted as the day progresses is unknown.  If our solicitors were to return 
the following morning and resumed the higher collection averages of the initial morning, 
we would wonder whether the physical nature of the task may play a role in the temporal 
effort profile. 
To examine the explanation for the higher solicitor performance in the Gift 
treatment in the early hours in greater detail, we dig a level deeper into the data.  This is 
important in light of the fact that individual characteristics such as physical attractiveness 
and sociability might influence contributions (see Landry et al., 2005).  With this in mind, 
we collected additional data from a subset of solicitors who returned to work on the 
Sunday morning directly after their Saturday solicitation.  Nine solicitors in the Gift 
treatment and four solicitors in the noGift treatment were included in the subset.   
We provide Figure 3 in the Appendix to include these Sunday morning data.  In 
this case, Gift subjects and noGift subjects perform similarly, as their outcomes are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels:  Gift  solicitors raised roughly $6.50 
whereas noGift solicitors raised nearly $8.50.  We view these data as providing evidence 
that exhaustion effects are not important in attenuating gift exchange in our Saturday 
afternoon data.   
Most importantly for our purposes, as employers genuinely interested in creating 
a library at least cost and adequately funding a public good in North Carolina, we  
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attempted to put a set of seminal findings from behavioral economics to work.   
Unfortunately, our plan backfired, as paying wages of merely $10-$12 would have netted 
us more books logged and more donations collected per dollar spent on labor.  Of course, 
similar to any empirical exercise, it is possible that a different experimental design and 
calibration, or other types of manipulations, might provide evidence that suggests certain 
behavioral findings have some relevancy for wage policies.
7  We hope that our study, 
which should be viewed as a first exploration of whether social preferences per se are 
enough to justify wage policies predicated on their existence, will stimulate further work 
using real pay and productivity measures from field settings of varying work durations.   
IV.  Discussion 
Besides their significance in testing important economic theories, our field results 
are important in interpreting empirical findings gathered in laboratory experiments.  To 
our knowledge, there has been no direct test of whether experimental results gathered in 
the span of an hour or two can be used to make inference on tasks that are inherently 
much longer lived.  There is, however, an emerging literature using laboratory and survey 
evidence that relates to our work.   
Concerning laboratory evidence, a handful of recent studies explore conditions 
that facilitate or weaken the strength of gift exchange.  For example, Fehr and List (2004) 
use a laboratory experiment to examine how Chief Executive Officers in Costa Rica 
behave in sequential prisoner’s dilemma games and compare their behavior with that of 
Costa Rican students.  They find that for both subject pools use of sanctions can reduce 
                                                 
7 For instance, it would have been useful to obtain insights on how the subjects’ interpreted the wage 
increase in terms of a fairness variation.  Yet, such a manipulation check would be unusual in this sort of 
environment and potentially compromise the naturalness of the field experiment; thus we avoided such a 
design.    
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cooperative behavior (see also Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000).  Houser et al. (2005) report 
similar results using a large sample of George Mason University undergraduate student 
subjects.  Charness et al. (2004) report that laboratory gift exchange is considerably 
influenced by whether or not a comprehensive payoff table is made available to subjects.  
Likewise, data from Engelmann and Ortmann (2002) and Rigdon (2002) highlight that 
student behavior depends critically on parameterization and implementation 
considerations.   
While these studies represent important tests in drawing out the boundary 
conditions for laboratory gift exchange experiments, our results make a much different 
distinction.  We interpret our findings as suggesting that great care should be taken before 
making inference from laboratory experiments, which might be deemed as “hot” decision 
making, to field environments, which typically revolve around “cold” decision making.  
Our results therefore lend insights to perhaps a different interpretation of these laboratory 
studies as well.
8   
  Survey evidence is another important source of data to study behavior in labor 
markets.  In an extensive study of business executives, Bewley (1999) considers why 
wages are downwardly rigid during a recession.  He reports that managers are worried 
that wage cuts might result in decreases in morale that would subsequently result in poor 
worker performance when the economy recovered, if not immediately.  Put more 
                                                 
8 Of course, with our data alone we cannot pinpoint whether the move to the field was necessary to observe 
the effects of task duration on behavior.  We trust that future work will parse these factors and explore 
whether longer timeframes in the lab can cause similar behavioral changes as those observed herein.  In this 
spirit, our study showcases the complementarities of field and lab experimentation that have been discussed 
in the literature (see, e.g., Harrison and List, 2004): given that we have discovered this behavioral pattern in 
naturally-occurring environments, researchers might wish to return to the lab and detail the types of 
variables that can cause, attenuate, or exacerbate these duration effects.  With this new evidence in hand, 
and perhaps equipped with deeper theoretical models, subsequent lab and field experiments can be 
conducted to examine the predictions.    
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succinctly, Bewley (p. 54) argues that “many factors influence morale, including 
especially good personal contact with supervisors, a spirit of community within the 
business, and the perception that company policy is fair. Businesspeople value good 
morale because it fosters high productivity, low turnover, and ease in recruiting new 
workers.”  
This line of reasoning highlights the importance of fairness considerations in 
cases of negative reciprocity.  With respect to positive reciprocity, as considered in our 
study, Bewley’s evidence is less conclusive.  He argues that morale is less important 
when considering wage increases, but finds that one main consideration when 
determining raises is the effect on employee turnover once the recession ends.  In this 
spirit, our results are consonant with those of Bewley:  his work suggests that there 
appears to be little connection between increasing pay and productivity, except to the 
extent that higher wages make it possible to attract, and retain, higher quality workers.   
V.  Epilogue 
Empirical evidence shows that wages in labor markets do not always clear the 
market: in many cases, firms pay a higher than market-clearing wage, resulting in 
involuntary unemployment.  One of the seminal theories that was put forward to explain 
this observation is the fair wage-effort theory, which predicts that wages above market-
clearing levels can be an equilibrium in labor markets.  Despite its profound implications, 
there does not exist compelling evidence from naturally occurring markets supporting or 
refuting this theory.  This is not surprising in light of the difficulties associated with 
executing a clean empirical test of such phenomena.  When such data are available, it is  
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difficult to separate out the consequences of factors of primary interest from the host of 
simultaneously occurring stimuli.   
Experimental markets and laboratory studies alleviate many of these problems 
and provide an attractive basis for analyzing such issues.  In this spirit, an influential line 
of laboratory experimental research has evolved that shows the importance of reciprocity 
in labor market settings, lending empirical support to the fair wage-effort theory.   
Whether such results have important implications for real labor markets remains 
an open empirical issue, however.  We begin to resolve this uncertainty by exploring 
individual behavior in two distinct labor markets:  data entry and door-to-door 
fundraising.  We report two major insights.  First, consistent with findings in the 
experimental literature, a higher wage was reciprocated by greater effort on the part of 
the employees during the early hours of the task.  Second, this higher effort level was not 
persistent:  after a few hours, effort levels in the gift treatment mirrored those in the non-
gift treatment.   
More generally, a methodological contribution of this study is to show that field 
experiments can be used as a means to examine the representativeness of the 
environment.  For example, before we can begin to make sound arguments that behavior 
observed in the lab is a good indicator of behavior in the field, we must explore whether 
certain dimensions of the laboratory environment might cause differences in behavior 
across these domains.  This study highlights one of several important dimensions.
9  
Future research should explore these insights more closely, and extend the tests to 
examine other dimensions as well as negative reciprocity.  We should stress that our 
sample sizes are small and that we do find behavioral similarities across the lab and the 
                                                 
9 Harrison and List (2004) provide a discussion of many other important dimensions.  
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field over short durations (as does, e.g., Gneezy, 2006).  A useful exercise for future 
research is to increase the sample sizes and to return to the lab to explore the robustness 
of our insights by examining, for example, whether, and to what extent, our results are 
robust to various lab manipulations.   
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Table 1 Summary Data—Books Logged 










1  56  61 58 63 
2  52  52 51 45 
3  46  44 52 42 
4  45  41 43 38 
5  41  29 33 25 
6  38  42 44 46 
7  37  39 38 38 
8  34  35 32 37 
9  32  32 28 27 
10  26  30 33 35 
noGift 
Average  40.7  40.5 41.2 39.6 
         
11  75  71 60 58 
12  64  65 63 61 
13  63  65 59 63 
14  58  40 35 31 
15  54  42 33 34 
16  47  35 28 25 
17  42  37 47 39 
18  37  29 30 30 
19  25  20 20 22 
Gift 
Average  51.7  44.9 41.7 40.3 
 























































Table 2  Regression Results 
    
 Library  Task    Fundraiser 
Variable    Variable  (Hourly)  (3 Hour Block) 
 
Gift 10.9  Gift 3.4 13.8 
 (6.6)   (3.3)  (5.8) 
 
Time2  -0.2  Time2 3.0  --- 
  (1.6)   (2.8)   
 
Time3  0.5  Time3 -3.6  --- 
 (1.6)   (2.8) 
 
Time4  -1.1  Time4 -1.2  --- 
 (1.9)   (2.8) 
 
Gift*Time2  -6.6  Time5 2.6  --- 
 (3.1)   (2.8) 
 
Gift*Time3 -10.5  Time6 -1.3  0.70 
 (3.1)      (2.8)  (4.4) 
 
Gift*Time4  -10.2 Gift*Time2  2.0  --- 
  (3.3)   (3.7) 
 
Constant  40.7 Gift*Time3  1.6  --- 
  (3.6)   (3.7) 
 
   Gift*Time4  -0.9  --- 
    (3.7) 
 
   Gift*Time5  -5.8  --- 
    (3.7) 
   Gift*Time6  -2.2  -12.6 
    (3.7)  (5.9) 
   Constant  6.6  19.2 
    (2.4)  (4.4) 
 
N 76    138  46 
Notes: 
1.  Dependent variable is the number of books logged in the library task and money raised in the 
fundraiser (in 3-hour blocks in Column 3).  Gift = 1 if the agent is in the gift treatment, 0 otherwise. 
Timet variables are dichotomous and equal 1 when work is carried out in that period, 0 otherwise.  
Gift*Timet variables are dichotomous interactions between the gift treatment and the time period.   
2. Standard errors are in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates.   
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Table 3:  Summary Statistics – Average Earnings by Treatment 
  Non-Gift   Gift   Difference 






























    
Pre-Lunch per Hour 






Post-Lunch per Hour 






Entire Day per Hour 






    
Number  of  Solicitors  10 13  
 
Note:  Cell observations give the mean and standard errors for the average earnings for solicitors 
in the non-gift exchange and gift-exchange treatments (Columns 2 and 3 respectively).  Column 4 
provides the difference in average earnings between the solicitors in the non-gift treatment from 
the earnings of solicitors in the gift treatments.  The fourth column also indicates whether the 
difference is significant at the p < 0.05 level (**) or p < 0.10 level (*) using a non-parametric 
Wilcoxon test.  For example, solicitors in the non-gift treatment raised on average $6.60 during 
the first hour of work whereas solicitors receiving the gift earned an average of $10.00 during this 
same hour.   
 
 
Table 4:  Average Earnings – Within Treatment by 3 Hour Block 
 Pre-Lunch  Post-Lunch  Difference 











Note:  Cell entries provide summary statistics for average earnings per hour for the 3-hour blocks 
before and after lunch across our two treatments (gift exchange and non-gift exchange).  Standard 
errors for the earnings are in parentheses.  Column 4 provides the difference in average hourly 
earnings within a treatment across these blocks.  ** indicates that the reported difference is 
statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level using a matched pairs t-test. 
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Appendix.  Solicitation Scripts for Door-to-Door Fundraiser 
 
ECU Center for Natural Hazards Mitigation Research - Script 
 
(If a minor answers the door, please ask to speak to a parent. Never enter a house.) 
 
Hi, my name is _____________________. I am an ECU student visiting Pitt County households 
today on behalf of the newly formed ECU Natural Hazards Mitigation Research Center.  
 
(Hand the blue brochure to the resident). 
 
You may recall hurricanes Dennis and Floyd five years ago led to widespread devastation in 
Eastern North Carolina, hence the State authorized the new Hazards Center.  
 
This research center will provide support and coordination for research on natural hazard 
risks, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and flooding.  
 
The primary goal of the center is to reduce the loss of life and property damages due to 
severe weather events.  
 
We are collecting contributions today on behalf of the new ECU Hazards Center. The Center 
is a non-profit organization.  
 
 
To raise funds for the new ECU Hazard Center we are conducting a charitable raffle: 
•  The winner receives a $1,000 prepaid MasterCard. 
•  For every dollar you contribute, you will receive 1 raffle ticket. 
•  The odds of winning this charitable raffle are based on your contribution and  total 
contributions received from other Pitt County households 
•  The charitable raffle winner will be drawn at the Center on December 17
th at noon. 
The winner will be notified and the results posted on the Center’s web site. 
•  All proceeds raised by the raffle will fund the Hazards Center, which is a non-profit 
organization. 
 
Would you like to make a contribution today? 
 
(If you receive a contribution, please write a receipt that includes their name and contribution 
amount). 
 
If you have questions regarding the Center or want additional information, there is a phone 
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